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SPECIAL FEATURE




Inherent in the very notion of a right to “seek” asylum is the ability to
move. As a guarantee of surrogate or substitute national protection for
seriously at-risk persons,1 refugee law operates only outside the bounds of
the refugee’s country of nationality or habitual residence. This constraint
is a pragmatic recognition that – notwithstanding some progress on bring-
ing human rights to bear inside sovereign states2 – the international com-
munity is presently truly able to guarantee rights only once an individual is
beyond the reach of her home country. And guarantees of rights to the
fundamentally disfranchised are precisely what refugee law promises: not
only the right to be safe, but the right to join a new national community
until and unless protection is restored at home.3 So if an at-risk person
cannot leave her country and enter some other state, then the protection
promised by the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees cannot be
delivered.
While fewer states today than during the Cold War era seek actively to
block the departure of disfavored minorities, the ability to leave one’s own
country is today severely compromised by internationally sanctioned ef-
forts to stop human trafficking (by definition an exploitative practice) and
smuggling (consensual illegal border crossing).4 However well-meaning
these efforts to stop often dangerous voyages may be, it remains that the
unlawful arrival of refugees is pragmatically required – both because no
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1. This understanding of refugee law has been endorsed by senior courts, including in
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Respondent S152/2003 (2004) 222 CLR 1
(High Court) (Austl.); Canada (Att’y Gen.) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 (Can.); and Horvath
v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep’t [2001] 1 AC (HL) 489 (appeal taken from Eng.).
2. The notion of a “responsibility to protect” – that would in principle ensure respect
for the internationally guaranteed human rights of persons still inside their own country –
remains very much a work-in-progress. See generally ANNE ORFORD, INTERNATIONAL AU-
THORITY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2011).
3. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”) art. 1, Apr.
22, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (defining “refugee” and identifying the beneficiary class for the
rights set out in articles 2-34 of the Convention); see generally JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE
RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
4. James C. Hathaway, The Human Rights Quagmire of ‘Human Trafficking,’ 49 VA.
J. INT’L L. 1, 33-34, 37 (2008).
1
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state issues a visa to travel to seek asylum and because the increasing so-
phistication of border controls creates the need and market for smugglers
(and, for the truly impoverished, traffickers) to guide the refugee to the
asylum that is in principle on offer. Yet the notion that a refugee, in order
to save her life, should have to first put her life on the line by entrusting
herself to a smuggler or trafficker is surely repugnant. How does one rec-
oncile the imperative to combat exploitation to the importance of ensuring
the availability of escape routes to safety?
Even if able to reach the border of a safe country, refugees increas-
ingly confront blunt barriers – fences, walls, and the like – that prevent
them from making their claims to protection. While the core legal duty of
non-refoulement precludes a state party to the Refugee Convention from
sending a refugee away “in any manner whatsoever,”5 is there a breach of
this duty if the refugee is effectively turned away by the mere existence of
a non-responsive, man-made barrier?  More generally, is it right to see the
duty of non-refoulement as absolute even if, for example, the numbers ar-
riving to seek protection are clearly beyond the receiving country’s
capacity?
Nor do constraints on movement end if refugees are able to cross the
border into a safe state. To the contrary, many countries routinely detain
refugees arriving to seek protection for no reason other than the fact that
their arrival has not been pre-authorized. In some states that detention is
ongoing, including during what can be many years pending a decision on
the asylum application. Even when refugee status is recognized, refugees
may still find themselves unable freely to choose their place of residence,
to move internally, or to travel abroad. At what point must the reasonable
interests of a host state in ensuring order within its territory yield to the
imperative to not only treat refugees with dignity but also enable them to
reestablish their lives with freedom and opportunity?
Lastly, freedom of movement can be an issue even when protection is
restored in the refugee’s home country, meaning that refugee status at in-
ternational law comes to an end and repatriation may, at least in principle,
lawfully be pursued. In practice, too many states pursue repatriation pre-
maturely or on the basis of other than the authentic Convention cessation
standards,6 causing refugees to be dispatched to places of risk or endemic
suffering.7 Equally sadly – if at times, understandably – the return of refu-
gees who wish to reestablish themselves in their country of origin may be
resisted by that country’s government, particularly where it struggles to
recover from war or other disaster. In both these contexts, international
law must strive to balance the legitimate concerns of states (reasonably
seeing their risk-based duty of protection to come to an end, or wishing to
ensure the stability of a fragile country of origin) and the equally legiti-
mate concern of refugees not to be unfairly compelled to leave the asylum
5. Refugee Convention, supra note 3, Art. 33(1).
6. Refugee Convention, supra note 3, Art. 1(C).
7. See HATHAWAY, supra note 3, at 922-35.
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country, or conversely, to freely exercise their right to go back to their
homes.
Movement in all of its senses – to leave a dangerous country, to get
into a safe state, to avoid unjustified detention or other constraints once
there, to enjoy the mobility requisite to a free and productive life, and to
go home if and when conditions truly allow – is thus an ever-present con-
cern throughout the refugee journey. From a legal optic, refugee freedom
of movement is an issue regulated under an often-confusing amalgam of
refugee law and the increasingly vibrant norms of international human
rights law. States and international organizations have thus struggled to
understand both the interrelationship of refugee-specific and general legal
standards, and more generally to appreciate the ways in which that synthe-
sized body of international law ensures both the meaningful protection of
refugees and respect for the fundamental interests of the states that re-
ceive them.
Against this backdrop, the ambitious goal of the Eighth Colloquium
on Challenges in International Refugee Law was to develop a principled
and workable framework to guide the process of defining the rights of
refugees to freedom of movement. Working with refugee law expert Pro-
fessor Marjoleine Zieck of the University of Amsterdam, a group of senior
University of Michigan law students first researched the issue from the
optic of both international law and comparative state practice.8  Professor
Zieck then drew on this research to author a comprehensive background
study which was refined by a second group of senior Michigan law stu-
dents.9  A select group of highly regarded international scholars and jurists
was then invited to meet with a third group of Michigan law students over
three days in March and April 2017 to debate the issues raised in the re-
vised background study (and published in this issue) and to agree to the
standards that comprise the “Michigan Guidelines on Refugee Freedom of
Movement.”10
It is our hope that, as in the case of earlier Michigan Guidelines on the
International Protection of Refugees,11 these unanimously agreed stan-
8. The members of the Comparative Asylum Law seminar in fall 2015 who conducted
this research were Adrienne Darrow Boyd, Carol (Liz) Bundy, Alina Charniauskaya, Ian
Green, Iris Kessels, Alison Lisi, Stephanie Motz, Jennifer Nelson, Kate Ogg, Megan Pierce,
Vladislava Stoyanova, Karima Tawfik, and Kelsey Vanoverloop.
9. The members of the Refugee Law Reform seminar in fall 2016 who vetted and
refined the draft study were Nessma Bashi, Soojin Cha, Erin Collins, Ariel Flint, Allison
Hight, Thalia Lamping, Matthew Lind, Jennifer Nelson, Salvatore Nicolosi, Mariana Pereira,
Eric Sloat, Francis (Tom) Temprosa, Xun Yuan, and Kristine van Doorn.
10. James C. Hathaway et al., The Michigan Guidelines on Refugee Freedom of Move-
ment, 39 Mich. J. Int’l L. 5 (2017).
11. Earlier guidelines have also been published in the Michigan Journal of Interna-
tional Law. James C. Hathaway et al., The Michigan Guidelines on Risk for Reasons of Politi-
cal Opinion, 37 MICH. J. INT’L L. 234 (2016); James C. Hathaway et al., The Michigan
Guidelines on the Exclusion of International Criminals, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 3 (2013); Pene-
lope Mathew et al., The Michigan Guidelines on the Right to Work, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 293
(2010); James C. Hathaway et al., The Michigan Guidelines on Protection Elsewhere, 28
MICH. J. INT’L L. 207 (2007); James C. Hathaway et al., The Michigan Guidelines on Well-
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dards will inspire a thoughtful and principled debate among scholars, offi-
cials, and judicial and other refugee law decision-makers committed to the
legally accurate and contextually sound application of international refu-
gee law norms.
Founded Fear, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 491 (2005); James C. Hathaway et al., The Michigan
Guidelines on Nexus to a Convention Ground, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 210 (2002); James C.
Hathaway, The Michigan Guidelines on the Internal Protection Alternative, 21 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 131 (1999).
